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Abstract 
The transition of the energy system increases the urgency to cope with the intermittency of renewable 
energy sources to keep the electricity network balanced. Demand Response (DR) measures are a prom-
ising approach to align the electricity consumption, especially of industrial consumers, with current 
electricity supply. While adequate information systems (IS) are already in place to dynamically adapt 
electricity consumption patterns, industrial consumers are still reluctant to implement DR measures due 
to uncertainty of their financial performance. Nevertheless, studies on risk transfer instruments related 
to DR investments are still scarce. To contribute to the closure of this research gap, we examine the risk 
transfer capability of Flexibility Performance Contracts (FPC). We derive cash flow structures for rep-
resentative FPC designs, calculate risk premiums and enable the comparison of corresponding risk 
profiles. Presented FPCs are evaluated based on a real-world industrial use case. Thereby, the financial 
performance is modelled stochastically, taking electricity price fluctuation, industrial process charac-
teristics and IS-backed decisions into account. Our results reveal that FPCs represent well-suited risk 
transfer instruments for DR measures. Thus, FPCs have the potential to accelerate the application of 
DR measures and therefore to complement existing capabilities of IS in the context of electricity net-
works. 
 
Keywords: Financial Risk Mitigation, Demand Side Management, Demand Response, Energy Manage-
ment System Aggregators 
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1 Introduction 
The transition of the energy system towards the integration of intermittent renewable energy sources 
increases the volatility and uncertainty about fluctuations of electricity supply (Ludig, Haller, Schmid 
and Bauer, 2011). Due to physical constraints, it is crucial to balance supply and demand at any point in 
time. Therefore, a growing necessity for flexibility in electricity systems arises as a prerequisite to ensure 
electricity system stability (Boscán and Poudineh, 2016). 
A widely-recognized approach to achieve this flexibility are Demand Side Management (DSM) 
measures, which strive to change electricity demand to follow fluctuations in power generation by in-
fluencing timing and magnitude of consumer demand (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011). Demand Response 
(DR) can be defined as a subclass of DSM and describes short-term changes in consumer’s electricity 
consumption patterns induced by time-varying electricity prices or financial incentives (Albadi and El-
Saadany, 2008). Literature states several beneficial effects of DR measures. Shifting load from peak to 
off-peak periods reduces the need for electricity generation and network capacity (Strbac, 2008). A re-
duced network capacity can lead to a more efficient utilization of the transmission network (Strbac, 
2008). Similarly, DR measures can be used to dissolve network constraints on a distribution level and 
to reduce network investments (Strbac, 2008). Thus, DR measures can contribute to improve the effi-
ciency of electricity systems and to lower electricity costs for industrial consumers due to their high 
energy intensity (Paulus and Borggrefe, 2011). 
In order to facilitate and to profitably use DR measures, industrial processes must be embedded in in-
terconnected information systems (IS). This IS infrastructure is required for the implementation of in-
telligent devices and autonomous controllers, which enable bidirectional information and communica-
tion streams (Callaway and Hiskens, 2011). Most industrial loads are equipped with fundamental com-
munication technologies (Lund, Lindgren, Mikkola and Salpakari, 2015). Hence, the technical require-
ments for DR implementation are already fulfilled in many cases. Although DR benefits are widely 
acknowledged from a practical perspective, industrial consumers are still reluctant to participate in DR 
measures. Key barriers are market risks that lead to uncertainties concerning financial benefits, potential 
risks for production processes and changes in the dynamic regulation of the electricity system (Alcázar-
Ortega, Calpe, Theisen and Carbonell-Carretero, 2015). 
Within electricity systems, flexibility aggregators support industrial consumers in utilizing their flexi-
bility potential and overcoming these barriers. Besides technical installation and system maintenance, 
flexibility aggregators provide expertise in assessing and exploiting financial benefits as well as in ful-
filling necessary requirements, e.g. the prequalification process for participation in DR measures 
(Ikäheimo, Evens and Kärkkäinen, 2010). As most existing markets for flexibility require certain mini-
mum trading volumes, flexibility aggregators help providers of small flexibility capacities, by combin-
ing individual flexibilities (pooling) and reducing transaction costs for all industrial consumers (Ottesen, 
Tomasgard and Fleten, 2018). Additionally, prices on these markets are usually exposed to a certain 
volatility and uncertainty. Therefore, revenues from the provision of flexibility are uncertain and repre-
sent an economic risk for flexibility providers. Further risks for flexibility providers may arise from 
operational, technological, contextual as well as measurement and verification challenges (Mills, 
Kromer, Weiss and Mathew, 2006). The decision-makers of industrial consumers are usually risk-averse 
(Gambardella and Pahle, 2018). For this reason, investments in expanding the potential for DR provision 
might be omitted, although being profitable in the long term. Flexibility aggregators may mitigate these 
risks for an industrial consumer acting as flexibility provider by assuring guaranteed revenues for DR 
provision. The flexibility aggregator receives a share of the DR measure revenues in return for providing 
services and taking financial risks. Literature usually calls the amount of reduced risks with such guar-
antees by the term risk mitigation capability (Töppel and Tränkler, 2019). 
The benefit allocation between the flexibility provider (e.g. an energy intensive industrial consumer) 
and the flexibility aggregator - and therefore the risk mitigation capability - is defined individually in a 
Flexibility Performance Contract (FPC). Therein, the flexibility provider transfers the right of using its 
flexibility to the FPC issuer (e.g. a flexibility aggregator) and receives financial performance in return. 
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Generally, the financial compensation for the FPC consists of a fixed and a variable incentive sharing 
payment (Behrangrad, 2015).  
FPC issuers are able to manage market risk exposure, through a diversified portfolio of flexibilities 
related to electricity consumption and generation, based on market knowledge, regulatory expertise and 
their superior access to market information (Harbo and Biegel, 2013). Currently FPCs are mainly im-
plicitly offered by flexibility aggregators in combination with further DR-related services such as the 
provision of the required operational expertise and technological infrastructure. It is conceivable that 
entities like insurance companies could issue risk transfer instruments similar to FPCs, deploying their 
risk management expertise on a portfolio level and complementing their product portfolio. Although the 
business model and contracted services of flexibility aggregators have already been addressed in current 
research contributions (e.g. Ikäheimo et al., 2010; Behrangrad, 2015; Ottesen et al., 2018), examinations 
on the risk transfer capability of FPCs regarding the financial performance of DR measures are still 
scarce. 
While technological aspects of DR-related IS are already relatively well understood, further effort to 
quantify the economic dimension of DR is still required (Feuerriegel, Bodenbenner and Neumann, 
2013). Ongoing advances in IS-enabled data processing and analysis allow a more efficient use of DR 
measures and build the foundation for a reasonable and efficient offering of FPCs. Thus, the aim of this 
paper is to answer the following research question: How do Flexibility Performance Contracts contrib-
ute to risk mitigation of Demand Response measures for industrial consumers? Therefore, we derive 
FPC designs and provide a profound methodology for industrial consumers to evaluate the profitability 
and risk profile of contracted DR measures, using a quantitative approach for the comparison of different 
FPC designs regarding their risk mitigation capability. 
We outline the theoretical background of this paper in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive specific cash 
flow structures of FPC designs. Further, we propose an equivalence principle that allows the comparison 
of different contract designs with respect to their risk profile. In Section 4, we present the case study of 
an industrial cooling house with a refrigeration system to evaluate our model. We use real-world data 
and process constraints as key information for a stochastic forecasting model, whose outcomes are pro-
cessed in a linear optimization model providing decision support to determine the most beneficial elec-
tricity consumption strategy. In Section 5, we present the empirical results of the case study and derive 
the present value distribution for the application of a Time-of-Use (ToU) electricity tariff as a specific 
DR measure. We apply proposed FPCs as risk transfer instruments and evaluate their individual risk 
mitigation capability. Final conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
2 Theoretical Background 
Energy informatics is a research discipline that focusses on the analysis, design and implementation of 
IS to enhance the efficiency of energy systems (Richard T. Watson, Boudreau and Chen, 2010). Ad-
vanced IS and communication technologies play a central role to support the optimization of electricity 
networks (Chen, Boudreau and Watson, 2008; Corbett, 2011). The implementation of DR measures 
requires advanced metering infrastructures, intelligent devices and specialized processors (Siano, 2014). 
DR-related IS provide the transmission medium for signals and information, support decisions on when 
to shift loads, and initiate and control the load shifting process (Fridgen, Häfner, König and Sachs, 
2016). Key capabilities of IS in this area are bidirectional communication streams, smart metering and 
load control between electric utilities and consumers (Callaway and Hiskens, 2011). DR measures ne-
cessitate integrated IS that facilitate an automated exchange of information between electricity consum-
ers and suppliers (Richard T. Watson et al., 2010). IS transmit the data required to execute a DR measure, 
e.g. to apply an optimization algorithm and autonomously trigger adaptions in electricity consumption 
patterns. Emerging business models build up on this advanced information and communication technolo-
gies and IS infrastructure. They strive to establish energy-related services to exploit untapped financial 
benefits (Richad T. Watson, Lawrence, Boudreau and Johnsen, 2013). 
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Energy service providers support electricity consumers with the implementation of energy-related in-
vestments. Energy services include energy analyses and audits, project design and implementation, 
maintenance and operation as well as monitoring and evaluation of financial savings resulting from 
implemented energy services (Bertoldi, Rezessy and Vine, 2006). In literature, energy service compa-
nies are related to the implementation of energy efficiency measures and can be defined as a subclass of 
the more general term of energy service providers (Bertoldi et al., 2006). Energy service companies 
contribute to financial risk mitigation through energy performance contracts for energy efficiency in-
vestments (Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017). In this context, Mills (2003) proposes an energy savings 
insurance serving as a risk transfer instrument for an energy efficiency investment in exchange for a 
premium. Hence, risks of an energy efficiency investment are transferred to the energy service company 
or insurer (Mills, 2003). For the first time, Töppel and Tränkler (2019) quantitatively model energy 
efficiency insurances as well as energy performance contracts and compared their risk mitigation capa-
bility.  
Similar to energy performance contracts, Boscán and Poudineh (2016) suggest such contracts related to 
investments in flexibility. Entities already providing flexibility-enabling services, which also include 
adequate contracts, are mostly cited as flexibility aggregators (Carreiro, Jorge and Antunes, 2017). Flex-
ibility aggregators support consumers to exploit prospective financial benefits of DR measures. Thereby, 
the role of a flexibility aggregator is twofold: First, consumers are provided with the infrastructure and 
expertise required to use flexibility, such as the implementation of decision support systems to derive 
the most beneficial electricity consumption strategy. Second, the financial performance of a flexibility 
investment is insured through a Flexibility Performance Contract (FPC), serving as a risk transfer in-
strument. These legally binding contracts assure a transparent relationship between both parties, prevent 
information asymmetry and determine the allocation of benefits resulting from DR measures.  
The financial performance of most energy-related investments is affected by various internal and exter-
nal factors (Mills et al., 2006). This also leads to insecurity regarding decisions for the provision of 
flexibility and prevents the implementation of DR measures in electricity markets (Alcázar-Ortega et 
al., 2015). In the following, we define the term financial risk as exposure to a financial underperformance 
of flexibility investments, due to the influence of internal and external factors. We outline a brief over-
view of financial risk factors that must be incorporated for a holistic risk assessment of flexibility im-
plementation projects. Therefore, we follow Mills et al. (2006), who analyze the financial risks associ-
ated with energy-efficiency projects. The proposed risk categories comprise economic, operational, 
technological, contextual as well as measurement and verification risks.  A detailed explanation for each 
financial risk category in the context of DR measures can be obtained from Table 1. 
From the perspective of an industrial consumer, operational, technological, as well as measurement and 
verification risks can be summarized as internal risks and rather have technical characteristics. Industrial 
consumers can usually handle such risks best by themselves, as they have the highest transparency about 
these internal factors. Contextual and economic risks are external factors, which cannot or only hardly 
be influenced by industrial consumers. While contextual risks may also be hardly quantifiable, it is 
usually possible to measure economic risks, especially for external service providers, which are special-
ized in handling uncertainties on the markets. For this reason, we focus on the economic risks within the 
scope of this work. Nevertheless, a mitigation of economic risks by FPCs may indirectly affect the other 
risk categories, by balancing the associated risks with guaranteed revenues. 
So far, research contributions to the topic of financial risk transfer instruments for DR measures are very 
limited. Harbo and Biegel (2013) as well as Behrangrad (2015) state that the allocation of financial 
benefits determined in a FPC can be constant during the contract lifetime, variable depending on annu-
ally realized benefits or any type in between these forms. Nevertheless, contract designs are not elabo-
rated in detail and no specific cash flow structures were proposed. Thus, a thorough definition of remu-
neration schemes defined within FPCs is still missing (Carreiro et al., 2017). 
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 Financial Risk 
Category 
Contextualization for DR Measures 
E
x
te
r
n
a
l 
Economic 
Economic risk covers uncertainties regarding electricity prices, tariff structures, tariff 
levels or other financial incentives for the provision of flexibility (Mills et al., 2006). 
An increased electricity market price volatility, due to the ongoing integration of re-
newable electricity generation, represents a prevailing economic risk (Mosquera-
López and Nursimulu, 2019). 
Contextual 
Contextual risk covers the accuracy of information on environmental conditions and 
the facility (Mills et al., 2006). These include liability and warranty conditions as well 
as changes in future politics (Weeber, Lehmann, Böhner and Steinhilper, 2017). Due 
to previous load curtailments, higher peak loads may lead to unintended increased 
network tariffs charged against the flexibility provider (Alcázar-Ortega et al., 2015). 
In
te
rn
a
l 
Operational 
Operational risk can be related to a reduced financial performance of flexibility 
measures due to negative effects on operating processes (Mills et al., 2006). The exe-
cution of DR measures may lead to additional process costs, quality losses or operat-
ing delays. Flexibility providers must take the economic value of loads into account, 
which cannot be recuperated somewhere later in time (Paulus and Borggrefe, 2011). 
Technological 
Technological risk includes the equipment and system performance (Mills et al., 
2006). Integrating flexibility to industrial processes tends to increase the overall sys-
tem complexity and the dependency on detailed and accessible external information 
(Weeber et al., 2017). Moreover, privacy issues arise from collecting and processing 
electricity usage information, which contain private information and activities or 
choices of flexibility providers (Carreiro et al., 2017). 
Measurement 
and Verification 
Measurement and verification risk refers to simulation and metering accuracy or 
measurement bias (Mills et al., 2006). Especially for the metering of bidirectional 
electricity flows, achieving precise measurement results represents a considerable 
challenge (Carstens, Xia and Yadavalli, 2018). Thus, high technical requirements on 
advanced metering infrastructure (e.g. smart metering) are necessary to ensure an ac-
curate documentation of real-time electricity consumption information 
(Lampropoulos et al., 2018). 
Table 1. Definition of risk categories affecting the financial performance of DR measures. 
In our work, we consider a FPC as an energy service contract that ensures economic risks related to the 
implementation and execution of a DR measure. IS and especially autonomous decision support systems 
are a prerequisite for the efficient execution of DR measures and therefore determine their financial 
performance. Hence, FPCs also insure the risks associated with executions of such systems. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is no literature about specific FPC designs or insurance products, which account 
for the implementation of DR measures. This underlines that current literature does not sufficiently 
cover risk transfer instruments for DR measures. We argue that further analyses of FPC in the context 
of DR measures are highly relevant, as the financial risks of DR provision are comparatively high, which 
can be traced back to the uncertainty and the volatility of electricity markets. This emphasizes the need 
of risk mitigation itself and the need for adequate designs of FPCs. Therefore, we are the first to derive 
explicit FPC designs and analyze to which extent FPCs contribute to risk mitigation for industrial con-
sumers and how decisions on FPC designs can be performed. 
3 Methodological Approach 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the risk mitigation capability of FPCs. Therefore, we derive current 
FPC designs, identify corresponding cash flow structures between the flexibility provider and FPC is-
suer and show how risk premiums can be calculated. Next, we introduce an equivalence principle to 
enable comparability of considered FPCs. Finally, we apply an established risk measure to determine 
the most beneficial risk transfer contract from the viewpoint of a risk averse decision maker. 
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3.1 Introducing Flexibility Performance Contract Designs 
We consider a standard setting with a FPC issuer and a flexibility provider and omit transaction costs 
occurring between the FPC issuer and the flexibility provider for reasons of clarity. Financing costs are 
not considered in this analysis, as they do not affect the functionality of FPCs. We use the term electricity 
bill savings referring to the financial benefit arising from the implementation and execution of a DR 
measure. We distinguish between two major FPC design characteristics: 
Flexibility Performance Insurance Contract (FPIC) 
A risk event occurs for the flexibility provider if the annually realized electricity bill savings fall below 
a predefined level. In this case, the FPC issuer is obligated to pay any shortfalls below this level to the 
flexibility provider. In return for this obligation, the FPC issuer receives a constant annual premium 
payment. The FPC issuer does not participate in savings exceeding the predefined level of electricity 
bill savings. From the viewpoint of a FPC issuer, the annual cash flow of the FPIC is defined as follows: 
where 𝑆𝑡 are the realized electricity bill savings in period 𝑡. 𝐾
𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 denotes the guaranteed level of annual 
electricity bill savings in the FPIC. The premium payment 𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 from the flexibility provider to the 
FPC issuer is constant during the contract lifetime. 
Flexibility Savings Guarantee (FSG) 
The FPC issuer guarantees a certain level of annual electricity bill savings to the flexibility provider. 
Annual shortfalls below this level are reimbursed during the contract lifetime. Electricity bill savings 
exceeding this level are shared at a predefined rate. The opportunity to participate in savings replaces 
the fixed premium payment of the FPIC. From the perspective of the FPC issuer, the FSG exhibits the 
following annual cash flow structure: 
where 𝐾𝐹𝑆𝐺 is the guaranteed level of annual electricity bill savings in the FSG and 𝛼 ∈ ℝ+ is the share 
of annual electricity bill savings exceeding the level of 𝐾𝐹𝑆𝐺, retained by the FPC issuer. Thus, the FPC 
issuer obtain a stochastic payment 𝛼(𝑆𝑡 − 𝐾
𝐹𝑆𝐺)+, which depends on the annually realized electricity 
bill savings. 
We assume that FPCs are priced under perfect information. This means moral hazard and adverse se-
lection are neglected for our analysis (Akerlof, 1970). Thus, realized electricity bill savings 𝑆𝑡 are per-
fectly observable for all involved parties. Furthermore, FPC issuers are considered to hold a diversified 
portfolio of assets and to pursue a risk neutral pricing strategy (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Hence, 
pricing is based on the expected present value of losses resulting from a specified risk event. In accord-
ance with the assumptions of perfect information and risk-neutral pricing, the fair premium payment 
𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 for the FPIC can be derived as follows: 
𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 =
(1+𝑟)𝑇𝑟
(1+𝑟)𝑇−1
∑ 𝐸[
(𝐾𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶−𝑆𝑡)+
(1+𝑟)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 ]. (3) 
3.2 Equivalence Principle 
Following Töppel and Tränkler (2019), we introduce an equivalence principle to ensure comparability 
of different risk transfer contracts. We apply this equivalence principle to the defined FPCs. Thereby, 
we take the viewpoint of a FPC issuer, who receives a certain annual premium payment for a given risk 
transfer policy. A risk transfer contract 𝐶𝑖 claims customer premium payments Π𝑖 =  {𝜋𝑖,1, … , 𝜋𝑖,𝑇} dur-
ing the contract lifetime 𝑇, where 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 is the premium payment of contract 𝑖 at time 𝑡. A premium pay-
ment 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 can be deterministic or stochastic, depending on the individual contract design. Risk transfer 
𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 =  𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 − (𝐾𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 − 𝑆𝑡)+, (1) 
𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑆𝐺 =  𝛼(𝑆𝑡 − 𝐾
𝐹𝑆𝐺)+ − (𝐾
𝐹𝑆𝐺 − 𝑆𝑡)+, (2) 
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contracts are regarded as equivalent, if they exhibit the same present value of expected premium pay-
ments during the contract lifetime 𝑇. It follows that two equivalent risk transfer contracts 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 with 
the same maturity 𝑇 and constant actuarial interest rate 𝑟 need to fulfil the equilibrium condition: 
∑ 𝐸 [
𝜋1,𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
] = ∑ 𝐸 [
𝜋2,𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
]𝑇𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 . (4) 
We apply this general equilibrium condition to the specific risk transfer contracts FPIC and FSG. The 
premium payment 𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 is constant over the entire contract lifetime 𝑇. In contrast, 𝜋𝑡
𝐹𝑆𝐺 = 𝛼(𝑆𝑡 −
𝐾𝐹𝑆𝐺)+ denotes the stochastic premium payment for the FSG, depending on the annual electricity bill 
savings 𝑆𝑡. Thus, Formula 4 leads to the following equilibrium condition to ensure the equivalence of 
FPIC and FSG: 
∑ 𝐸 [
𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶
(1+𝑟)𝑡
] = ∑ 𝐸 [
𝛼(𝑆𝑡−𝐾
𝐹𝑆𝐺)+
(1+𝑟)𝑡
]𝑇𝑡=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 . (5) 
For a given 𝐾𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶, we can determine 𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 in accordance with Formula 3. As Formula 5 includes the 
variables 𝛼 and 𝐾𝐹𝑆𝐺, there is no unique solution for the equilibrium condition. Therefore, we assume 
𝐾𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 = 𝐾𝐹𝑆𝐺 for the guaranteed level of annual electricity bill savings of both contracts. Finally, the 
equivalence condition can be fulfilled with a unique solution for 𝛼: 
𝛼 =
∑ 𝐸[
𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶
(1+𝑟)𝑡
]𝑇𝑡=1
∑ 𝐸[
(𝑆𝑡−𝐾
𝐹𝑆𝐺)+
(1+𝑟)𝑡
]𝑇𝑡=1
. (6) 
3.3 Risk Mitigation Capability 
We apply the Value-at-Risk (VaR) to identify the FPC, which minimizes the financial performance risk 
of the implementation and execution of DR measures for a risk averse flexibility provider. The VaR is 
a widely used risk management tool in the financial and non-financial sector and offers a simple quan-
tification and interpretation of risk (Sadeghi and Shavvalpour, 2006). Hendricks (1996) defines the VaR 
as a decline of the portfolio value, which might occur over a predefined period with a given probability. 
Most important variables affecting the VaR are the considered time period and the probability of not 
exceeding a certain shortfall, which is determined by a confidence interval (1 − 𝛾) expressed in percen-
tiles (Hendricks, 1996). The confidence level is denoted by 𝛾 ∈ ]0, 1[ and determines the probability of 
a shortfall below the VaR (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath, 1999). We define the VaR as: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛾(𝑋) = 𝐹𝑋
−1(𝛾), (7) 
where 𝑋 is a random success variable and 𝐹𝑋
−1 denotes the inverse of the cumulative distribution func-
tion of 𝑋. Hence, 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛾(𝑋) represents a certain value for the random variable 𝑋, which will be undercut 
only by a given probability 𝛾. The design of a risk transfer contract 𝐶𝑖 determines the annual cash flows 
𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑖, which depends on the stochastic annual electricity bill savings 𝑆𝑡 for a specific flexibility measure. 
Hence, discounted annual cash flows 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑖 result in a present value denoted by 𝛴𝑖  , that follows a certain 
probability distribution. In this case, practitioners prefer a high VaR of the random variable 𝛴𝑖 and, thus, 
define the risk minimal random variable 𝛴∗ as: 
𝛴∗ = max
𝛴0,𝛴1,…,𝛴𝑛
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛾(𝛴𝑖),  (8) 
where 𝛴0 denotes the present value distribution of electricity bill savings without FPC and each 𝛴𝑖 cor-
responds to a specific risk transfer contract 𝐶𝑖 with 𝑖 ∈ { 1, … , 𝑛}. Formula 8 can be applied to determine 
the FPC that exhibits the most favorable risk profile from the viewpoint of a risk averse decision maker. 
4 Case Study Overview 
The following model evaluation demonstrates the applicability of the methodological approach pre-
sented in Section 3. We model the financial risk of a DR measure, calculate fair risk premiums and 
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compare the risk profiles of FPIC and FSG. First, we present and use empirical data in a comprehensive 
statistical process to forecast electricity prices. Second, forecasts are processed in a linear programming 
model under conditions of a real industrial process, providing decision support to determine the most 
beneficial electricity consumption strategy. Third, we derive the present value distribution based on 
annual electricity bill savings for one specific DR measure. Finally, we apply FPIC and FSG contract 
designs to the DR measure to allow a risk mitigation comparison. 
4.1 Project Profile and Data 
We examine the economic benefit of a DR measure based on an industrial refrigeration system that is 
common in the food or retail industry. The cooling pump of a refrigeration system does not need to be 
in ongoing operation. Therefore, such systems allow a temporal shift in power consumption as long as 
the refrigeration temperature stays within defined boundaries. The application of a Time-of-Use (ToU) 
electricity tariff is a well-suited DR measure in this context. A ToU tariff is characterized by a constant 
electricity price within set time intervals but varying electricity prices among different time intervals 
(Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008). Peak hours are penalized with a higher price, incentivizing consumers 
to adapt their consumption pattern and to minimize electricity costs (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011). 
The refrigeration system characteristics as well as the fluctuating ToU electricity prices determine the 
extent to which an adjusted electricity consumption strategy can lead to electricity bill savings. Table 2 
summarizes the plant-specific characteristics of the considered refrigeration system. Further, we con-
sider market data from the EPEX SPOT German Intraday Auction to infer historical ToU price levels 
(EPEX SPOT, 2018). The data comprises the time interval from January 2015 to March 2018. For our 
analysis, we had hourly mean values of these electricity prices available (in €/MWh). In Section 4.2, we 
describe the fitting of a stochastic process to this data to pre-estimate future electricity prices. 
 
Refrigeration System Characteristics of Case Study 
Constant Load (𝑷𝒆𝒍.) 
Maximum 
Temperature 
(𝝑𝒎𝒂𝒙.) 
Minimum 
Temperature 
(𝝑𝒎𝒊𝒏.) 
Positive Temp. 
Gradient (𝒈𝒑𝒐𝒔.) 
Negative Temp. 
Gradient (𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒈.) 
Value 150 kW 5.00 °C 2.00 °C 1.05 °C/h -1.45 °C/h 
Table 2.  Summary of refrigeration system characteristics. 
4.2 Modelling Uncertainties of Realized Electricity Bill Savings 
ToU tariffs rely on electricity market prices and reflect the market situation within an electricity system 
(Strbac, 2008). Therefore, ToU prices are stochastic as they are exposed to extensive uncertain fluctua-
tions of electricity market prices (Mosquera-López and Nursimulu, 2019). These price fluctuations can 
be regarded as the decisive factor of uncertainty for electricity bill savings resulting from the use of DR 
measures in this context. Temporally high prices represent a risk for the flexibility provider, as they lead 
to high electricity costs compared to a constant electricity tariff. 
Since the electricity price data shows autocorrelation, we build on an autoregressive moving average 
(ARMA) approach developed by Box, Jenkins, Reinsel and Ljung (2015). Additionally, we observe 
strong daily variations. Thus, we extend the ARMA model for parameters, which take account of a 
regular pattern that repeats over a certain time lag. We adopt a seasonal autoregressive moving average 
(SARMA) approach. Moreover, the electricity prices exhibit a time-varying variance. Since the SARMA 
error terms do not follow a normal distribution with constant variance, we apply a generalized auto-
regressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) process to model a conditional variance (Bollerslev, 
1986). This results in a hybrid SARMA-GARCH process to describe hourly electricity prices. Similar 
models, which incorporate such time series characteristics are frequently used to model and forecast 
electricity prices (Garcia, Contreras, van Akkeren and Garcia, 2005; Liu and Shi, 2013; Kumar, Singh, 
Singh and Mohanty, 2018)Next, we elaborate the optimal schedule for the use of the DR measure, which 
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refers to the electricity consumption strategy of the refrigeration system. We assume the decision-maker, 
i.e. the flexibility provider, has perfect information about future electricity prices and there are no sur-
charges on wholesale-prices. Hence, forecasted electricity prices equal actual ToU electricity prices. To 
determine the optimal electricity consumption schedule, generally an optimization problem is formu-
lated and solved by optimization techniques and algorithms (e.g. Conejo, Morales and Baringo, 2010; 
Siano, 2014; Deng, Yang, Chow and Chen, 2015). We process forecasted electricity prices in a linear 
programming model to determine the optimal consumption strategy. The resulting linear program can 
be written as: 
Minimize 𝐶(𝑎𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  𝑝𝑡  𝑃𝑒𝑙. 𝑑,   (9) 
subject to: 
𝑎𝑡  𝑑 𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑔. + (1 − 𝑎𝑡) 𝑑 𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑠.  ≤  𝜗𝑚𝑎𝑥. − 𝜗𝑡−1  𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, (10) 
 −𝑎𝑡  𝑑 𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑔. − (1 − 𝑎𝑡) 𝑑 𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑠. ≤  𝜗𝑡−1 − 𝜗𝑚𝑖𝑛.  𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, (11) 
0 ≤ 𝑎𝑡 ≤ 1  𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, (12) 
where  𝑃𝑒𝑙., 𝜗𝑚𝑎𝑥., 𝜗𝑚𝑖𝑛., 𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑠., 𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑔. are the refrigeration system characteristics summarized in Table 2. 
The duration 𝑑 of each optimization period is one hour and 𝑝𝑡 represents the hourly electricity price. 
The linear program is solved each time for the following day (Day-Ahead). The decision variable 𝑎𝑡  de-
notes the cooling pump utilization of the refrigeration system for each hour. The temperature 𝜗𝜏 at a 
specific time 𝑡 = 𝜏 can be calculated in the following way: 
𝜗𝜏 = 𝜗0 +  ∑ [𝑎𝑡  𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑔.
𝜏
𝑡=1 + (𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡) 𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑠.], (13) 
where 𝜗0 = 3.5 °C is a permissible starting temperature. The objective of the linear program is to mini-
mize daily electricity costs. Temperature constraints and gradients of the refrigeration system are con-
sidered in Formulas 16 and 17. The hourly utilization of the cooling pump is specified in Formula 18. 
4.3 Fitting Results 
We used the statistical platform R CRAN to estimate the SARMA-GARCH parameters. The packages 
‘forecast’ and ‘fGarch’ were applied to estimate the model parameters. Both methods follow a maxi-
mum-likelihood approach for estimation. We identified the order of our model with the SARMA 
(𝑝, 𝑞) × (𝑃, 𝑄)𝑆 and GARCH (𝑘, 𝑙) components based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). To 
ensure model simplicity, we set the parameters 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑘, 𝑙 ≤ 1. With an AIC value of about 165,000 
the SARMA (1,1) × (1,1)24 model was found to be the most suitable. Table 3 depicts the estimated 
model parameters. 
 
Model 
Component 
SARMA GARCH 
Parameter 𝝁 𝝋𝟏 𝜽𝟏 𝜱𝟏 𝜣𝟏 𝝎 𝜶𝟏 𝜷𝟏 
Mean 31.8731 0.9310 -0.2021 0.9962 -0.9308 0.3470 0.1216 0.8671 
Table 3. Parameter means of the fitted SARMA-GARCH electricity price process. The p-Value 
is smaller than 0.001 for all parameters.  
5 Empirical Results 
To derive the present value of a ToU tariff application to the refrigeration system, electricity price esti-
mations were processed in the linear programming model, leading to the most beneficial electricity con-
sumption strategy. We defined electricity bill savings as the difference of annual electricity costs in-
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curred through a constant electricity tariff and electricity costs incurred through the adapted consump-
tion through a ToU tariff. Next, the present value of the annual electricity bill savings was simulated 
𝑁 = 10,000 times for a contract lifetime of 𝑇 = 5 years. Thereby, the constant price for electricity was 
assumed to be identical for all performed simulations. Moreover, we did not consider operating and 
maintenance costs. A constant actuarial interest rate of 𝑟 = 5 % was assumed. Figure 1 represents the 
resulting present value distribution of electricity bill savings. 
 
Figure 1. Simulated present value electricity bill savings distribution for an exemplary DR ap-
plication. 
The nearly symmetric distribution has a positive mean value of 10,554 € and a standard deviation of 
11,619 €. On a confidence interval with a level of significance 𝛼 = 0.001, the present value takes ex-
treme values from −27,282 € to 48,734 €. Such extreme values occur if simulated electricity prices of 
the ToU tariff deviate significantly from the predefined constant electricity price. We suppose that the 
constant electricity price can be hedged with forward contracts and other derivatives and is therefore not 
subject to any variation over the considered time interval. Although the positive mean and the right tail 
of the distribution suggest high prospective benefits from the DR measure, the 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.01 of −16,310 € 
indicates high financial risks. Electricity price peaks can result in high ToU tariffs and even lead to 
negative electricity bill savings.  
To derive the present value distribution for the FPIC, we first set 𝐾𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 = 1,200 €. Second, we derive 
the corresponding fair premium 𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 = 1,192 € for the FPIC by applying Formula 3. With these ini-
tial parameters, we obtain the present value distribution of the electricity bill savings as depicted in 
Figure 2. Since we only assume a fair risk premium, we observe the same mean as obtained without the 
consideration of a FPC. A standard deviation of 7,752 € indicates less dispersion of the present value. 
Extreme values range from 36 € to 43,575 € and the 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.01 can be increased, similarly to the mini-
mum value, to 36 €. This clearly implies a risk transfer towards the issuer of the FPIC. 
Next, we use the proposed equivalence principle to determine the share of electricity bill savings retained 
by the FSG issuer for 𝑆𝑡 exceeding 𝐾
𝐹𝑆𝐺. Given 𝐾𝐹𝑆𝐺 = 𝐾𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶  , Formula 6 returns a value of 𝛼 = 49 % 
for the share of annual electricity bill savings retained by the FPC issuer. The corresponding simulation 
findings are illustrated in Figure 3. A low standard deviation of 3,950 € leads to a close value range 
from 5,195 € to 27,379 €. The 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.01 of the FSG is 5,195 € and indicates a higher risk mitigation 
capability compared to the FPIC. It should be noted that an increasing 𝛼 leads to the convergence of the 
present value distribution towards a constant payment to the flexibility provider until 𝛼 = 1. Thus, the 
determination of 𝐾 and 𝛼 respectively define the risk transfer capability of the FSG. The model evalua-
tion reveals that both contracts, the FPIC and the FSG, contribute to risk mitigation of ToU measures. 
The FSG is favorable with respect to a smaller standard deviation. In contrast, the FPIC allows to obtain 
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high electricity bill savings at the right tail of the distribution. Therefore, higher risks must be incorpo-
rated compared to the FSG. 
 
Figure 2. Simulated present value electricity bill savings distribution with FPIC 
(𝐾𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 = 1,200€, 𝜋𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶 = 1,192 €). 
 
Figure 3. Simulated present value electricity bill savings distribution with FSG 
(𝐾𝐹𝑆𝐺 = 𝐾𝐹𝑃𝐼𝐶, 𝛼 = 49 %). 
Figure 4 presents additional findings that underline the results of the risk mitigation comparison from 
above for different levels of guaranteed electricity bill savings 𝐾. The 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.01 is shown for the three 
present value distributions depending on the level of 𝐾. The 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.01 without a risk transfer contract is 
constant as it is independent of 𝐾. In the interval from 0 € to 2,440 € for 𝐾, the FSG consistently leads 
to the highest 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.01. By applying Formula 6 again, we obtain a 𝛼 > 1 for 𝐾 exceeding the value of 
2,440 €. In this case, annual electricity bill savings exceeding 𝐾 would lead to additional payments 
from the flexibility provider to the FSG issuer. Hence, the prior risk mitigation effect of the FSG is 
inverted as reflected in the vast decline of the 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.01. Whereas the FSG can even lead to a leverage 
effect, the FPIC shows a monotonously increasing 𝑉𝑎𝑅0.01 depending on the predetermined level of 𝐾. 
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Figure 4.  Comparison of risk mitigation capability based on the VaR. 
To summarize, the results of our simulation show that the FSG is clearly beneficial with respect to the 
applied risk measure and is even superior to the FPIC. Only for very high guaranteed electricity bill 
savings the preference will be reversed in favor of the FPIC. In general, both FPCs offer risk transfer 
opportunities. Nevertheless, the risk mitigation capability of FPCs is very sensitive to the determination 
of individual contract parameters. This underlines the importance of an adequate FPC design and ap-
propriately fitted contract parameters for both, flexibility providers and FPC issuers. Hereby, IS can 
offer an important contribution for an efficient fitting of parameters and therefore significantly reduce 
the financial risk of flexibility providers. FPCs can contribute to a broad implementation of DR measures 
and more generally to the adoption of DSM. Therefore, FPCs augment the economically viable and 
socially useful application of IS. 
6 Conclusion 
The integration of renewable energy sources in the electricity system increases the importance of a broad 
implementation of flexibility in electricity demand. IS facilitate the use of flexibility measures and can 
thereby contribute to a more efficient and sustainable electricity system. This paper assessed the capa-
bility of FPCs to mitigate financial risks for flexibility providers. Therefore, we evaluated how FPCs 
contribute to a transfer of performance risks related to the implementation and execution of DR measures 
from flexibility providers towards diversified FPC issuers. 
We extended existing literature by the concepts of two risk transfer contracts insuring financial risks, 
illustrated how to calculate a risk premium and derived an equivalence principle to compare different 
contract designs from a risk transfer perspective. A simulation-based model evaluation was presented 
for an industrial refrigeration system, which provides flexibility through the application of a ToU tariff. 
Forecasted electricity prices were processed within a linear programming model to derive the optimal 
electricity consumption strategy of the refrigeration system. Finally, we performed a simulation for the 
present value of annual electricity bill savings. Our results reveal that the implementation of a ToU tariff 
entails high risks as electricity market price developments lead to temporarily or permanently increasing 
electricity prices for the ToU tariff. In some cases, electricity bill savings do not materialize at all for 
the flexibility provider. Hence, the ToU tariff can be even unfavorable compared to a conventional con-
stant electricity tariff. Although existing IS already provide the technological foundation that enables 
the efficient execution of DR measures, these findings underline the necessity for risk transfer instru-
ments to foster a broad implementation of DR measures. Nevertheless, the results have shown to be very 
sensitive, which emphasizes the importance of determining contract parameters with appropriate risk 
mitigation. 
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In line with our methodological approach, we confirmed the functionality of FPCs as risk transfer in-
struments for flexibility investments. The model evaluation showed that FPCs positively contribute to 
risk mitigation of investments in the provision of flexibility. While the FSG offers higher risk transfer 
capabilities for ordinary guaranteed saving levels, the FPIC retains opportunities for high financial ben-
efits. Therefore, considered FPCs are well-suited risk transfer instruments for flexibility providers. They 
enhance the attractiveness of DR measures and increase incentives to invest in the provision of flexibility 
for risk averse flexibility providers.  
Present business models related to energy services, and particularly FPCs, rely on an advanced infor-
mation availability and processing. Hence, it is the task of IS to foster the development of forecasting 
methods and algorithms to ensure the economic profitability of DR measures. Solely an advanced IS 
infrastructure can process information from different sources with the necessary degree of efficiency 
and accuracy. For FPC issuers, it is decisive to manage and hedge market risks in a sufficiently large 
portfolio to keep counterparty risks small. Issuers can hedge FPCs with forward contracts and other 
derivatives on electricity markets or via over-the-counter trading. Besides flexibility aggregators, the 
expertise of other entities (e.g. insurance companies) could lead to a forward momentum for the devel-
opment and propagation of risk transfer contracts in the context of flexibility. 
Besides those implications, our work has some limitations: (1) only two different contract designs were 
derived to demonstrate the impact of the cash flow design on risk transfer capabilities. Therefore, future 
research may extend the two proposed FPCs for further contract designs. Since there are no limitations 
for the design characteristics of such bilateral contracts, various manifestations are considerable. Nev-
ertheless, FPIC and FSG are well-suited to illustrate coherencies between contract design and risk trans-
fer capability and provide a solid basis for further analyses. (2) Some reasonable assumptions were 
stated to allow a simplified comparison of the FPIC and FSG. Pricing under perfect information (Aker-
lof, 1970) and risk neutral preferences for the FPC issuer (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) were assumed. 
(3) The empirical case study relies on the application of a ToU tariff that represents only one specific 
application of a DR measure. Next to our presented case study, future work should examine FPC appli-
cations for further DR measures and additional electricity markets. Although a shift of electricity trading 
volumes towards energy-only-markets can be observed, other market places still offer possibilities to 
utilize flexibility, e.g. balancing power markets. (4) The fluctuating electricity price is the only risk 
factor that was regarded for our modelling approach. In addition to this economic risk, other risk cate-
gories related to the implementation of DR measures that we outlined in Section 2 could be included in 
future analyses. Future work should also incorporate additional risk factors of DR measures in combi-
nation with FPCs for a holistic evaluation of economic profitability. Special attention should be paid to 
IS that facilitate decision support systems, which determine and execute optimal electricity consumption 
strategies and algorithms for industrial processes. Advanced information-driven forecasting models 
should incorporate long-term effects to improve forecast accuracy. Optimization algorithms should 
adaptively respond to changes of the market environment and internal process constraints. 
Our results have the potential to accelerate the implementation of DR measures through the application 
of FPCs. This work contributes to the transition of our energy system towards the integration of renew-
able energy sources and, thus, to achieve the overarching objective of a more sustainable energy system. 
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